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PREFERENTIAL TRADE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC:
TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FOR MULTILATERALIZATION
By Mia Mikic
Introduction
There  are  two  broad  sources  of  preferential  trade.    It  can  be  based  on  trade
concessions extended unilaterally to selected trading partners without any expectations of
reciprocity.  Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes for developing countries
belong to this type of preferential trade.  Another source arises from the reciprocal preferential
trade agreements also known as regional trade agreements (RTAs).
1 The use of trade by
most Asian economies as a means of achieving fast growth and development has been
achieved with little reliance on preferential trade.  Participation by the Asia-Pacific economies
(members of ESCAP)
2 in the global (GATT/WTO) trading system from 1948 to 2007 is
illustrated in figure 1.  Membership in GATT/WTO grew slowly from the initial six to the
current 31 members over several decades.
3 On the other hand, the number of preferential
trade  agreements  (PTAs)  established  by  those  countries  exploded  in  a  relatively  short
period, from less than five in the late 1970s to more than 100 effective agreements in
mid-2007.
As figure 2 shows, the proliferation of regionalism among the Asia-Pacific countries
did not adversely affect exports of the Asia-Pacific GATT/WTO members, which make up
a  (slowly)  growing  share  of  total  GATT/WTO  exports  to  the  world.    However,  figure  3
1 The  terms  “preferential  trade  agreements”  (PTAs),  “preferential  trade”  and  “preferential  trade
liberalization”  are  loosely  used  to  refer  to  a  wide  variety  of  agreements  that  are  also  classed  as
“regional trade agreements” (RTAs).  It should be noted that members of RTAs are not always in
geographical proximity.  The term “regional integration” is used in this chapter as a synonym for RTAs
or PTAs.
2 ESCAP has 62 members and associate members, 58 of which are regional and four of which are
non-regional (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
the United States of America).  In this chapter, “Asia-Pacific” refers to the regional members.  More
information on ESCAP membership is available at <http://www.unescap.org/about/member.asp>.
3 When GATT was officially born in 1947, it had 23 founding members (“contracting parties”).  The
group included Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon, Chile, the former Republic
of China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syrian Arab Republic, South Africa, the United Kingdom and
the United States.  The countries from the Asia-Pacific region that have most recently acceded to
GATT are Tonga and Viet Nam.
Chapter II34
Figure 1.  Participation by Asia-Pacific economies in GATT/WTO and PTAs
Figure 2.  Exports by world, GATT/WTO and Asia-Pacific GATT/WTO members
Source: Membership in GATT/WTO extracted from information provided on the WTO website (http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm); membership in PTAs is taken from
APTIAD (http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/).
Note: AP = Asia-Pacific.
Source: Calculated  based  on  COMTRADE  data  downloaded  from  WITS,  and  membership  from
WTO.
Note: Asia-Pacific (AP) GATT/WTO include only regional members of ESCAP with full membership
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shows that exports from the Asia-Pacific GATT/WTO members to all GATT/WTO members
and to the region, as a share of their exports to the world, is rising although not at the
same pace.  It appears that intraregional exports have been growing slightly faster than
exports to WTO members since the establishment of WTO.  Although this difference is
very  small,  it  coincides  with  the  obvious  shift  in  their  policies  towards  PTAs  (which  is
captured by exponential increase in the number of PTAs shown in figure 1).  It cannot be
denied that since 1995 the Asia-Pacific economies, traditionally supporters of multilateralism,
have embraced PTAs as a basic trade policy option.  According to data in the Asia-Pacific
Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements Database (APTIAD), in 2005-2006 alone,
these economies signed or opened official negotiations on more than 40 various agreements.
This  chapter  assesses  various  dimensions  of  preferential  trade  in  the  region.
Section   A  first  offers  some  facts  and  figures  on  regionalism  in Asia  and  the  Pacific.
Section B provides more detail on the architecture of PTAs.  In particular, it examines the
scheduling approach, the extent of liberalization, types of barriers tackled, rules of origin
and  sectoral  coverage.    As  one  and  perhaps  most  feasible  ways  of  moving  towards
multilateralization of PTAs, section C considers the possibility of the geographical consolidation
of many Asian PTAs into the so-called “Pan-Asian Free Trade Area” (PAFTA).  Finally,
section D closes with a non-exhaustive list of directions of policy research that might offer
useful guidance to policymakers in this area.
A.  Facts and figures on PTAs in Asia and the Pacific
The status of regionalism, including the number of agreements under implementation
and their notification, is given in table 1.  As of mid-2007, 91 trade agreements that include
at least one member from Asia-Pacific (ESCAP region) were in force, and a further 11
Figure 3.  Asia-Pacific exports – looking more towards the region






































































































































































































were waiting for the completion of the ratification process to become effective.  At the
same time, the number of agreements under negotiation in APTIAD amounts to just over
30 because the database tracks only agreements with officially opened negotiations.  Most
of  the  agreements  recorded  as  under  negotiation  are  also  between  two  countries,  but
almost one third include a partner from another geographical region.
Most of the effective agreements (as of September 2007) and those pending ratification
(64) are of bilateral scope,
4 either between two countries in the region or globally.  The
group of agreements between a country and another regional trade agreement is relatively
large but mostly based on activities of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) as the trading
bloc (13 effective agreements in this group).  There is one other agreement, the Global
System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP).  This leaves 13 regional
trade agreements, two of which include members outside the region.
The  WTO  discipline  on  RTAs  (and  previously  GATT)  requires  members  to  be
transparent about their use of trade preferences and thus they are required to notify trade
agreements they negotiate.  The WTO notification process recognizes free trade areas
and customs unions as types of regional trade agreements that qualify under Article XXIV
of GATT.  All other agreements that do not qualify for notification under Article XXIV of
GATT fall into “partial scope agreements” in the area of goods liberalization and can be
notified only under legal cover of the Enabling Clause, paragraph 2(c).  The fourth type,
economic  integration  agreements,  is  reserved  for  liberalization  in  services  area,  to  be
4 Zhai (2006) commented that bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) were preferred because of their
lesser costs in terms of negotiation and enforcement efforts.  While this might hold true for every
individual member of BTAs, the resulting costs of all BTAs might easily be higher compared with all
RTAs.  Bonapace (oral communication) argues that this could be because of the lack of “peer pressure”
as  well  as  institutional  framework  that  is  often  missing  from  BTAs  but  built  into  many  RTAs.
Feridhanusetyawan  (2005)  held  that  the  faster  rate  of  increase  in  BTAs  than  in  RTAs  (plurilateral
agreements) contributed to a complexity of the picture, as many of those BTAs arose “within and
across different regional agreements”.
Table 1.  Status of regionalism in Asia and the Pacific
Total
BTA BTA BTA BTA RTA RTA RTA RTA
Other
total x-cont c-b total x-cont b-b
In force 91 64 50 14 13 14 11 2 0 1
Pending ratification 11 7 52 22020 0
Under negotiation 31 28 19 9 21010 0
Total notified 62 47 39 8 69701 1
Art. XXIV GATT 31 27 25 2 22200 0
Art. XXIV GATT and/or 20 17 11 6 21001 0
Art. V GATS
Enabling Clause 11 3 30 26500 1
Source: APTIAD, 2007 (July).37
notified under Article V of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  Since, in
practice, the taxonomy of trade agreements still needs to be harmonized with the one
adopted by WTO (see table 2), the record of notification in APTIAD jointly presents notifications
under Article XXIV of GATT and Article V of GATS for the agreements that are notified
separately under each.  Thus, in total, 62 agreements are registered as notified, with only
11 of them coming under the Enabling Clause.  From a cursory inspection of the agreements
that are not notified, it appears that they too will ultimately be notified under this category.
As mentioned above, a harmonized taxonomy of trade agreements is yet to be
universally applied and, in many cases, the textbook taxonomy of PTAs is not followed in
work of policymakers and/or researchers and analysts.  Various databases also use different
approaches.  Table 2 includes types of agreements reflecting titles used to describe the
agreements by countries themselves.  Two thirds of the effective agreements in the Asian
and Pacific region belong to the free trade area (FTA) category.  They also include agreements
in the area of trade in services, as APTIAD still does not record them separately.  There
are only two customs unions and 10 preferential trade agreements that are agreements of
“partial scope” in WTO classification.  A large number of the agreements (18) are classified
as  framework  agreements.    In  the  understanding  of  the  WTO  RTA  disciplines,  these
should  not  be  implementable  as  trade  liberalization  agreements.    Rather,  they  should
serve  to  guide  negotiations  on  the  “proper”  type  of  the  agreement.    However,  in
Asia  and  the  Pacific,  some  of  these  framework  agreements  contain  an  “early  harvest
programme”.  As such, they should be notified as “partial scope agreements”, which is not
often the case.
5
The fast multiplication of agreements shown in figure 1 resulted in an increasing
density of the “noodle bowl”
6 phenomenon associated with preferential trade.  The “noodle
Table 2.  Structure in terms of types of agreements
BTA BTA BTA RTA RTA Other
Total
x-cont c-b x-cont
Free trade agreement 44 8 4 4 1 0 61
Customs union 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
Preferential trade agreement 3 2 0 4 0 1 10
Framework agreement 3 4 8 2 1 0 18
Total 50 14 13 11 2 1 91
Source: APTIAD, 2007.
Notes: x-cont = cross-continental
c-b = country-bloc
5 Of these, only the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement, in force since 2003, was notified in 2004.
6 See Bhagwati, 1992, who is credited with introducing the original term, “spaghetti bowl”.  “Noodle”
was apparently introduced to the RTA vocabulary by Findlay and Pangestu (2001). Cf. Mikic, 2002.38
bowl” of preferential trade refers to the entanglement of bilateral and regional free trade
and other types of agreements that are in force as well as those that are in various stages
of  negotiations  (figure  4).    It  is  quite  appropriate  to  describe  this  state  of  affairs  as
a “motley assortment” (Baldwin, 2006) that is working against trade creation rather than for
it.    With  conflicting  rules,  these  preferential  agreements  tend  to  fragment  markets  and
increase trade costs, thus adversely affecting trade volumes as well as global and national
welfare.  For example, figure 4 illustrates how current regionalism results in the fragmented
Asia-Pacific market, with no established trade agreements between Central Asia and rest
of Asia and the Pacific.  Likewise, the Pacific is far from being well integrated into Asian
regionalism, while links between South Asia and the rest of the region are just emerging.
It appears that only the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) links South Asia, North Asia
and Southeast Asia, as well as high- and low-income developing countries.  Therefore, in
terms of promoting south-south cooperation, this agreement has a desirable scope.
The previous analysis reveals that from 1994 to the present, the number of all
agreements in force expanded from 10 to 91, a more-than-eightfold increase.  Of the total
58 ESCAP regional members, those involved in this proliferation of agreements increased
Source: APTIAD, Feb 2007, some PTAs not shown.
Figure 4.  Noodle bowl effect in Asia and the Pacific39
from  41  to  50  during  the  same  period.
7 Only one ESCAP-cum-WTO member remains
unattached to any of the trading blocs.  In contrast, most ESCAP members who are not
WTO members are members of at least one and up to 11 PTAs.  The average number of
agreements  in  force  per  ESCAP  member,  not  counting  those  countries  without  any
agreements, is 5.6.  This indicates multiple memberships and a significant overlap in the
membership of agreements.
Overlapping memberships arise from parallel BTAs and RTAs for the same set of
economies.  One country ends up negotiating with another under several unrelated framework
agreements.  Multiple and overlapping membership is spread across this region.  Only
eight ESCAP members and associate members are not involved in PTAs.  The maximum
number of agreements implemented by a country belongs to Singapore (19), followed by
Thailand (15), India (13), Malaysia (12) and Turkey (12).
The issue, however, is that with multiple agreements it is not known which particular
set of rules drives trade growth or which set might act as an obstacle.  The question
should also be asked whether an even larger effect on trade could have been achieved
with fewer agreements and, arguably, lower costs.  Finally, the impact of unilateral liberalization
processes in countries that are party to such agreements should not be ignored.
The total trade of ESCAP members has increased in absolute terms, and in 2005
accounted for almost 30 per cent of world exports and imports.  The value of their intraregional
trade  also  increased  dramatically  from  1980  to  2005  in  absolute  terms.    Starting  with
a slightly smaller value of intraregional trade than the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1980, by 2005 the intraregional trade of Asian and Pacific region had surpassed
NAFTA and had closed the gap with the European Union (15) from four-fifths to one-third.
As  a  share  in  total  world  trade,  this  intraregional  trade  grew  only  slightly  faster  than
the share of total Asia-Pacific trade in world trade (coefficient 1.36 compared with 1.29 –
rows 1 and 3 in table 3).
This information on growth in intraregional trade can be combined with an indicator
of trade dependence to tell us more about the “fortress building” attitude of trade agreements.
As  table  3  shows,  total  trade  dependence,
8 which is a contribution of total trade to the
region’s collective gross domestic product, increased by coefficient 1.5 over this period.
As trade can be split into intraregional and extraregional categories, it is helpful to track
intraregional and extraregional trade dependence as separate indicators.  Thus, an indicator
showing only the contribution of extraregional trade to the region’s gross domestic product
7 Agreements of non-regional members are not covered in the analysis unless signed with one or
more  regional  members  (e.g.,  the  United  States–Singapore  FTA  is  included,  while  the  United
States-Jordan FTA is not).  This currently leaves only three ESCAP members (Mongolia, Palau and
Timor-Leste) and five ESCAP associate members (American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam, New
Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands) not involved in preferential trade.  Of those countries, only
Mongolia is also a WTO member.
8 This indicator is often interpreted as “trade openness”.  See Bowen, Hollander and Viaene, 1998,
pp. 12-15.40
grew more than the total trade dependence (coefficient of 1.8 during the same 10 years),
while intraregional trade dependence grew by less – coefficient 1.3.  Despite relatively
small differences in these coefficients, they point to a lack of a significant increase in the
reliance on intraregional trade by ESCAP economies, giving no strong support to a claim
of the “appearance of the third mega trading bloc” to join the European Union and NAFTA.
Thus, even though intraregional trade is growing in both the absolute and relative sense, it
is difficult to identify this trend as trade diversion.
Furthermore,  a  reliable  measure  of  a  link  between  the  increase  in  intraregional
trade  and  the  existence  of  preferential  trade  (i.e.,  BTAs  and  RTAs)  is  still  lacking.    In
addition, does trade growth among members of the agreements precede or follow preferential
agreements?  These questions remain high on the list of future empirical research topics.
9
Identification of the share of trade associated with the establishment of the preferential
trade area is still one of the most tedious forms of empirical trade research (cf. Mayda and
Steinberg, 2007 and DeRosa, 2007).
Table 3.  ESCAP trade performance basics
(Unit:  %)
Category 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
Total ESCAP trade/world trade 22.7 23.4 26.3 26.3 28.2 29.4
Total intra-ESCAP trade/world trade 10.7 10.3 12.4 12.7 14.0 14.6
Total intra-ESCAP/total ESCAP trade 47.3 44.0 47.2 48.4 49.6 49.8
Total trade dependence 33.1 35.3 39.4 38.8 46.6 50.0
Intra-ESCAP trade dependence 19.0 18.1 20.1 18.8 23.1 24.9
Extra-ESCAP trade dependence 14.1 17.2 19.3 20.0 23.5 25.1
Marginal propensity to trade (total)
a ... -0.29 0.68 -0.17 0.71 0.85
Marginal propensity to intra-ESCAP trade
a ... -0.08 0.38 -0.25 0.37 0.43
Total number of BTAs in force 17 22 26 30 46 63
Total number of RTAs in force 5 6 6 6 8 11
Members with WTO status 22 24 25 26 29 29
b
Members with PTA status 44 44 44 45 49 50
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, WITS and WDI, May 2007.
a Marginal propensity to trade = change in trade value/change in GDP value (ranges from
0 to 1).
b 31  in  2007  (e.g.,  Viet  Nam  and  Tonga  became  members  on  11  January  2007  and
27 July 2007, respectively).
9 See Mayda and Steinberg, 2007 on the lack of evidence for across-the-board new trade creation
in response to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and DeRosa, 2007 for slightly
different arguments.41
In 2005, slightly less than 30 per cent of total ESCAP trade was associated with
members of BTAs and RTAs (table 4) even though intraregional trade amounted to almost
50 per cent of total ESCAP trade with the world (see table 3).  This trade among the BTA/
RTA members amounted to less than 9 per cent of world trade.
10 While close to 60 per
cent of PTA-linked intraregional trade was done by members of BTAs, more than half of
that  was  linked  to  BTAs  that  had  one  extraregional  member  (e.g.,  the  United  States,
European Union/EFTA).  This could indicate that there is still a great deal of untapped
potential for developing intraregional trade linkages among ESCAP members.
Table 4.  Trade of BTAs and RTAs in force, 2005*
Share in total ESCAP Share in total world
trade (%)  trade (%)
BTAs (61) 16.2 4.7
– Regional (33 BTAs) 6.6 1.9
– Other (28 BTAs) 9.6 2.8
RTAs (11) 13.2 3.9
– Regional (6 RTAs) 10.2 3.0
Total preferential trade 29.4 8.6
Total ESCAP trade 29.2
Memorandum items:
– Total ESCAP trade (US$ billion) 5 764
– Total world trade (US$ billion) 19 585
Source: Computed using APTIAD and COMTRADE data, May 2007.
* Where 2005 trade data are unavailable, data from the most recent available year are
used.
B.  Architecture
In  this  section,
11  the  architectural  characteristics  of  the Asia-Pacific  preferential
agreements are assessed.  The scheduling approach in terms of tariff liberalization, extent
of liberalization, types of trade barriers tackled by agreements, rules of origin and sectoral
coverage is examined.
10 Note that table 1 shows intra-ESCAP trade as 14.6 per cent of world trade in 2005.  Intra-ESCAP
trade is larger than the sum of trade by members of BTAs and RTAs under implementation (which
makes up 8.6 per cent of world trade).
11 This section borrows heavily from Mikic, 2007.42
1.  Approaches to tariff reductions in PTAs
How important is the contribution of preferential trade liberalization to the opening
of a country?  As noted above, declarative aspirations of all agreements are to transform
trade among partners into duty-free trade.  In many agreements, in fact, this is expressed
as an ultimate goal; however, partners are taking many different routes to achieve this
end.  Table 5 summarizes the difference in approaches to tariff reduction in the enforced
agreements that provide this information.  A positive list approach is considered, in principle,
as less liberalizing; it consists of members agreeing to the products on the (positive) list
whose tariffs will be reduced or eliminated.  A negative list approach assumes the reduction/
elimination of tariffs on all products except those that are included in the negative list.  This
approach is closer to the spirit of GATT, even though it may often include a long list of
excluded products.
Another important factor is the determination of a base tariff rate as a benchmark
for  reduction.    In  most  cases,  the  MFN-applied  rates  are  used  for  this  purpose
(cf. Feridhanusetyawan, 2005).  In an effort to comply with WTO rules on regional agreements,
most contain an intention to eliminate tariffs within what is considered a reasonable period.
When an LDC is involved, it is provided either with longer transition periods (e.g., AFTA) or
lesser or no reduction commitments (e.g., APTA).  Another interesting feature, and one
that supports previous claims about “made-to-measure” agreements, refers to asymmetrical
reciprocity in tariff reduction even when there is no LDC involved.  Feridhanusetyawan
(2005) described how, in the Singapore-United States FTA (which follows the “negative list
approach”),  the  United  States  kept  tariffs  on  about  8  per  cent  of  products  during  the
transition period of eight years while Singapore eliminated all tariffs immediately, binding
them to zero.  In the Singapore-Japan FTA (which follows a positive list approach), Singapore
again reduced all tariffs to zero immediately while Japan committed to eliminating its tariffs
gradually over a 10-year period.
Table 5.  Tariff reduction approaches
PTAs Positive list Negative list
All agreements in force (that provide information) 31 33
Bilateral trade agreements 22 25
Cross-continental plurilateral 0 1
Country-blocs 3 2
Regional trade agreements 5 5
Global 1 0
Free trade agreements 20 29
Framework agreements 4 1
Preferential trading agreements 6 2
Customs unions 0 1
Non-reciprocal arrangements 1 0
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, February 2007.43
2.  Rules of origin
The current proliferation of agreements has spun a complex web of rules of origin
(table 6).  In addition to each agreement having its own rules of origin, a bewildering array
of product-specific rules of origin is emerging.  Adopting the less restrictive rules of origin
could result in significant trade deflection and redundancy of a trade agreement, while
adopting the most restrictive rules of origin may result in no trade taking place under the
agreement.  Several chances have been missed, at both the WTO and regional levels, to
bring some uniformity to the formulation of preferential rules of origin.  GATT Article XXIV,
quite remarkably, is silent on the use of preferential rules of origin.  Should rules of origin
not  be  viewed  as  just  “other  regulations  of  commerce”  (referred  to  in Article  XXIV  of
GATT), in that they should not raise barriers to third countries any higher than the level
existing prior to the formation of PTAs?  The most that is said is embodied in a non-binding
common declaration on principles.
Table 6.  Rules of origin provisions in selected trade agreements
PTA Change in Specific man. Local value Cumulation
tariff class. process addition
BTAs
ASEAN-China Yes ... 40% Full
ASEAN- Yes ... 40% Full
Republic of Korea
Australia- ... ... 50% Bilateral
New Zealand
India-Thailand Yes (or VA) ... 20-40% Bilateral
4, 6 digit level product specific
product specific F.O.B. value
India-Sri Lanka Yes (or VA) ... 35% Bilateral
4 digit level F.O.B. value
Japan-Mexico ... No specific 50% with some Bilateral
process required exception
F.O.B. value
Republic of Korea- ... No specific 45% build down Bilateral
Chile process required method calculation,
30% build up
method calculation
Malaysia-Japan Yes (product ... 40% (product Bilateral
specific) specific)
Singapore- Yes ... 45-55% Bilateral
Republic of Korea
Singapore-Japan Yes (or VA) Yes 60% Bilateral
4 digit level F.O.B. value
Singapore-USA Yes (or VA) Yes 30-60% Bilateral
2, 4, 6 digit level product specific44
Table 6. (continued)
PTA Change in Specific man. Local value Comulation
tariff class. process addition
Singapore- ... ... 40% Bilateral
New Zealand Factory cost
Singapore-Australia ... ... 30-50% Bilateral
product specific
factory cost
Thailand-Australia Yes (and/or VA) Yes 40-55% Bilateral
4, 6 digit level product specific
product specific F.O.B. value
Thailand- Yes (product Yes Bilateral
New Zealand specific)
RTAs
Asia-Pacific Trade No tariff beading No specific 45% Full
Agreement change necessary process required (35% for LDC)
ASEAN Free Trade No tariff beading No specific 40% Full
Agreement change necessary process specified F.O.B. value




Source: Compiled from table 2 in Bonapace and Mikic (2006); and APTIAD.
This increases the urgency for establishing an overarching, region-wide, common
framework of principles, guidelines and procedures to which BTAs and RTAs would be
anchored.  Notwithstanding its non-binding nature, the point of departure should be the
WTO common declaration.  Ongoing work, notably in APEC, and other useful trade and
development elements found in other agreements should be built upon with this need in
mind.  For example, APTA recently agreed to common rules of origin (representing a wide
spectrum of industrial development among the members) that are relatively simple, general
and liberal, that is:
(a) A flat rate of a minimum 45 per cent of local value content (35 per cent for
LDCs) in bilateral rules of origin; and
(b) At  least  60  per  cent  (50  per  cent  for  LDCs)  of  regional  content  with  full
cumulation (cf. Baldwin, 2006).
Section C of this chapter discusses prospects for multilateralization of Asia-Pacific
PTAs  in  terms  of  geographical  consolidation.    However,  it  is  possible  to  approach
multilateralization through the functional consolidation in different areas, such as rules of
origin.  Consolidation of multiple membership agreements around more liberal rules of
origin  will  serve  as  a  tool  for  diminishing  noodle  bowl-related  costs  of  trading  under
preferential regimes.  One such example is provided by the recent consolidation of bilateral45
trade  agreements  among  the  southern  European  countries  and  a  replacement  by  the
common rules as part of an amended Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
deal.  The new CEFTA consolidates 32 bilateral trade agreements into a single regional
trade agreement.  The free trade area will be established for a transitional period ending,
at  the  latest,  on  31  December  2010.    The  new  consolidated  agreement  replaces  the
network (“spaghetti bowl”) of bilateral trade agreements in order to improve conditions for
promoting trade and investment by means of fair, clear, stable and predictable rules.
The agreement consolidates and modernizes the region’s “rule book” on trade, and
includes modern trade provisions on issues such as competition, government procurement
and  protection  of  intellectual  property.    It  facilitates  the  convergence  of  relevant
trade-related rules, notably with regard to industrial and sanitary-phytosanitary rules.  A
simplified single system of rules of origin (and other rules) makes it easier to trade within
the region.  Increased trade is necessary to promote growth, job creation and a reduction
in youth unemployment.  It is the foundation for stability and peace.  Such harmonization
and simplification of rules of origin in the subregions of Asia could contribute to a deepening
of integration, as the rules are associated with an increase in “seamless production”.
3.  Going beyond the goods trade
12
Many of the newer initiatives declare the intention to go well beyond the reduction/
elimination of tariffs and NTBs, including anti-dumping and safeguards, harmonization of
competition policies and standards, and customs.  However, a large number just remain
a collection of aspirations towards liberalization that tend to be associated with a longer
negotiation process.  In addition, despite these intentions to go deeper than trade integration,
there is only an occasional mention of the formation of a CU or a common market in the
Asia-Pacific region.
13
Furthermore,  in  the  context  of  multilateral  liberalization,  a  number  of  countries
strongly argue for more freedom in movements of labour (referring to Mode 4 liberalization)
when it comes to BTAs and RTAs, as only a few cover this area.  A comparison of BTAs/
RTAs of the Asia-Pacific region with existing deals in the Americas also illustrates a type of
reluctance to negotiate all-inclusive comprehensive agreements.  Instead, trade agreements
are  often  accompanied  by  separate  agreements  on  services,  investments,  intellectual
property protection, customs procedures etc.  Most of the new agreements cover trade in
services.  (However, pre-GATS agreements still have separate agreements on trade in
services, such as the ASEAN FAS).
12 Some of the agreements do not have legal texts either publicly available in English or at all, and
therefore might not have been captured properly in counting the sectors covered.
13 One such example is that of the already cited “single economic market” of Australia and New
Zealand.  At the zenith of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, there were also calls for the establishment
of a currency union.  They were later merged into proposals for an East Asian Community.46
Most of the newer agreements could be described as WTO-plus agreements as
they  extend  concessionary  coverage  beyond  multilaterally  agreed  disciplines  to  areas
such as government procurement, competition policy and the environment.  This is true for
trade agreements between developed economies, and between developed and developing
economies (Lesher and Miroudot, 2006).  It is important to note that most agreements
mention a number of WTO-plus sectors when describing the objectives of the agreement
(typically in the preamble of the agreement text).  However, a significant number of agreements
only include a statement of intention to negotiate liberalization in certain areas.  These
agreements have been excluded from the scope of this study because they do not count
for “substantive commitments”.
The  overview  that  is  provided  in  figure  5  only  shows  whether  a  concessionary
commitment has been made in a particular sector or not.  In order to provide a better
assessment of the beyond-the-goods commitments, a more detailed analysis of the legal
texts of the agreements is required.  The most frequently covered area is that of investment
provisions followed by IPRs and trade facilitation.  Other areas that also receive some
coverage are government procurement, competition policies and labour mobility.  Services
are  only  covered  in  24  agreements,  including  separate  agreements  for  some  parties.
Table 7 provides a summary of treatments of four sectors (investment, IPR, labour mobility
and services) with a view to differentiating between BTAs and other agreements in terms
of the coverage of these sectors.
Figure 5.  Overview of sectoral coverage by PTAs
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Table 7.  Summary of treatments of selected sectors in preferential trade
agreements in Asia and the Pacific
Intellectual property protection
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
BTA 19
a 16 (7)  17 (7)
Country-bloc  6
b 2  (1) –  5 (3)
RTA 2 1 – – 1  2
Other 1 1 – – –  –
Total 28 (9) 21 (8) 3 (1) 3  24 (10)
Investment
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
BTA 23
c 17 (4) 5 – 1 17 (4)
Country-bloc 6 2 4 – – 3
RTA 3 2 1 – – 1
Other 1 1 – – –
Total  33
a(4) 21 (4) 11 – 1 21 (4)
Mobility of labour
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
B T A 871– – 7
Country-bloc 1 – 1 – – –
R T A 211– – –
Other 1 1 – – – –
Total  12 9 3 – – 7
Services
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
BTA 18 17 1 – – 14
Country-bloc  3 2 1 – – 3
R T A   2–2– –   –
Other  1 1 – – –  –
Total 24 20 4 – – 17
Source: APTIAD; annex tables 2-5 in Mikic, 2007.
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of agreements involving Turkey.
a Includes seven BTAs between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Israel, Romania and Tunisia.
b Includes one agreement between Turkey and EFTA, and one between Turkey and the
European Union.
c Includes four BTAs between Turkey and Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Romania and Tunisia.48
In terms of scope of agreement, it is obvious that the “beyond-the-goods” sectors
are captured more often by agreements that are bilateral, i.e., between two countries or
between an established bloc and a country.  It is mostly FTAs that venture beyond goods
liberalization, except in the case of investment where FAs also feature.  It also appears
that BTAs-FTAs are notified to WTO more quickly than other agreements, thus contributing
towards transparency of trading rules at the global level.
C.  Towards multilateralization:  How?
Arguably, regionalism practiced by countries of Asia and the Pacific does not facilitate
trade effectively.  There is a need to start managing this process sooner rather than later,
but the best approach has not yet been identified (cf. Baldwin, 2006; Zhai, 2006; Bonapace
and Mikic, 2007).  In principle, multilateralization can be pursued after agreements become
closer  in  similarity  and  have  more  commonalities  in  terms  of  disciplines  adopted  and
extent of liberalization.  First, therefore, some progress needs to be made in terms of
“harmonization” of relevant areas in the agreements (e.g., rules of origin) before they can
be “multilateralized”.
One approach to consolidation that can serve as a handmaiden to multilateralization
is through geographical widening of current agreements or the consolidation of several
agreements into one; this would apply to both widening the geographical area and replacing
what would be a series of bilateral agreements in one region-wide trade agreement.
Amid uncertainties on the closure of the Doha Round negotiations, and the renewal
of a number of stalled talks on bilateral and regional FTAs, a proposal to negotiate the
so-called Pan-Asian Free Trade Area (PAFTA) is explored here as one possible vehicle of
consolidation (WTO, 2006).  This agreement is looking towards bringing together 16 members
including Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and members
of ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Malaysia,  Myanmar,  the  Philippines,  Singapore,  Thailand  and  Viet  Nam).    In  terms  of
collective  GDP,  PAFTA  would  become  the  third  largest  trading  bloc  in  the  world  after
NAFTA and European Union, based on data for 2004.
Among the three, only PAFTA would include non-WTO members (such as Brunei
Darussalam, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic).  All three blocs declare “free
trade” as their objective.  However, exports and imports of the two existing blocs and the
new  proposed  PAFTA  differ  (table  8).    More  than  half  of  the  European  Union’s  trade
consists of intraregional trade while NAFTA and PAFTA still rely on extraregional partners
for their trade.  Similarly, figure 6 shows the value of trade among the three blocs in 2005.
It is obvious that PAFTA is the “largest” trader, exporting more than US$ 500 billion to each
of the other blocs, and importing close to that amount from both of them, thus creating
a substantial trade surplus in this tripartite trade.
In evaluating the potentials of trade agreements, it is useful to use so-called trade
performance indicators.  In fact, APTIAD features such indicators for the number of agreements49






Population 458 429 3 121 3 855
GDP 12 804 020 13 366 295 9 443 842 10 952 556
Total exports 3 598 526 1 315 025 2 108 411 2 478 486
Total imports 3 583 461 1 990 202 1 907 263 2 417 024
Intraregional exports 2 387 270 736 366 801 166 1 146 555
Intraregional imports 2 239 240 702 589 890 276 1 277 805
Sources: Calculated from WDI and WITS, World Bank.
Note: Trade covers merchandise trade; all values are in millions (people or US dollars).
Figure 6.  Tripartite merchandise trade
Source: Calculated from WITS data for 2005.
* EU as a reporting country.
that  are  already  in  force  in Asia  and  the  Pacific.    Indicators  can  be  used  ex  post  to
evaluate performance of a free trade or other type of trade agreement after it has been
implemented or in some cases ex ante to try to infer economic impact from forming an
agreement.    Here  we  use  the  trade  dependence  index  (TDI)  and  regional  bias  index
(RBI).
14 These indices are summarized in table 9.











The TDI is a standard measure of the ratio of GDP contributed by international
trade with the rest of the world.  In literature, it is also called the “openness index”.  By this
measure,  it  appears  that  PAFTA  is  the  most  trade  dependent  on  extraregional  trade
(or most open) of the three blocs, since close to 25 per cent of its GDP is generated by
trade with others.  This overall index, although higher compared to the European Union
(just below 20 per cent) and NAFTA (close to 14 per cent) is, however, low compared with
those of individual countries of PAFTA, especially small trading economies with extensive
re-exporting, where this ratio rises above 100 per cent of GDP.
15 The overall index for
PAFTA,  being  an  average,  thus  obscures  significant  variations  of  national  indices  and
underestimates real trade dependence due to the impact of large countries such as Japan,
China and India, which contribute more to PAFTA’s GDP than to its trade.  Notwithstanding
this  fact,  the  TDI  for  the  European  Union  and  NAFTA  falls  over  time,  signalling  more
reliance on trade with in region.  In the proposed PAFTA area, the opposite trend can be
observed – the TDI with the rest of the world increases, indicating relatively less reliance
on intraregional trade compared to the other two blocs.
16
The RBI for member countries in a preferential trade agreement shows a level of
bias  towards  intraregional  trade  relative  to  trade  with  countries  outside  the  agreement
area.  When the index is equal to 1, the region is neutral in its geographical trade pattern.
This  means  that  the  share  of  intraregional  trade  in  its  total  trade  is  the  same  as  the
region’s total trade in world trade.  For the three blocs, the RBI values are larger than 1
over the whole period from 2000 to 2004, indicating a bias towards trading with itself.
17
Because the RBI is calculated without adjusting the values of exports and imports
to take into account price effects (such as a rise in oil prices) and exchange rates, care
Table 9.  Open – but towards whom?
Index  Agreement 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
TDI PAFTA 20.53 20.43 20.55 22.72 24.61
European Union 20.75 20.51 19.56 19.15 19.96
  NAFTA 13.96 12.81 12.38 12.77 13.96
RBI PAFTA 1.89 1.97 1.98 1.90 1.83
European Union 1.71 1.65 1.61 1.58 1.56
NAFTA 2.03 2.07 2.10 2.26 2.29
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE data downloaded from WITS.
Note: TDI = trade dependence index; RBI = regional bias index.
15 This is also true for smaller economies in the European Union, such as Belgium or Denmark.
16 Table 3 provides figures for ESCAP-wide trade dependence (25 per cent in 2005) which follows
the same trend as trade dependence for PAFTA.
17 This index normalizes the intra-regional trade share of a regional trading bloc for group size in
world trade as it is expected that a larger group would have a larger share of world and intra-regional
trade.51
should be taken in the interpretation of these values.  As the European Union already has
a very high proportion of intraregional trade, it is difficult to envisage further increases in
the RBI for that region.  NAFTA is similar, but PAFTA should differ as many border and
non-border  barriers  still  restrict  trade  among  proposed  members.    This  is  despite  the
existence  of  bilateral  trade  agreements  among  most  of  the  members  of  the  proposed
PAFTA (see figure 4).  Replacing multiple agreements that are not fully effective in liberalizing
trade with one trade liberalizing agreement could help to de-fragment markets and allow
faster growth of trade, not the least among developing countries in the bloc.  In doing so,
progress  made  by  existent  preferential  agreements  in  the  region  should  be  taken  into
account in order to combine this geographical consolidation with the functional one.  More
specifically, simple and regionally cumulative rules of origin as embraced by APTA should
be  adopted  by  PAFTA,
18  while  full  coverage  and  elimination  of  tariffs  on  goods  from
a  number  of  bilateral  agreements  in  the  region  should  be  the  goal  of  PAFTA  within
a reasonable period (not longer than 10 years).
Regional  integration  initiatives  are  often  associated  with  the  occurrence  of  one
“domineering”  economy  (in  PTA  parlance,  a  “hub”)  that  is  not  only  the  key  player  in
multiple trade agreements in a region, but also the main driver of regional trade.  In this
sense, it is useful to compare the country market shares of these three blocs in intraregional
exports and imports in 2004.  In the European Union, the largest three suppliers to the
integrated market are Germany (24 per cent), France (12 per cent) and the United Kingdom
(9  per  cent).    In  NAFTA,  about  40  per  cent  of  intraregional  exports  originate  from  the
United States.  In PAFTA, Japan contributes 26 per cent of intraregional exports, followed
by China (20 per cent) and the Republic of Korea (13 per cent).
At the same time, these countries absorb most of the intraregional imports.  In the
European Union, Germany, France and the United Kingdom buy 19 per cent, 12 per cent
and 12 per cent of total intraregional imports, respectively.  The United States is even
more dominant as an importer in NAFTA, absorbing 59 per cent of intraregional imports.
In PAFTA, China buys 27 per cent, followed by Japan (24 per cent) and the Republic of
Korea  (12  per  cent).    Extending  supply  chains  in  order  to  integrate  other  developing
countries,  and  particularly  LDCs,  into  intraregional  exports  and  imports  would  be  one
potential benefit from the establishment of PAFTA.
D.  Impacts and future research directions
Are these mushrooming PTAs in Asia and the Pacific a healthy development, or do
they  make  “a  noodle  bowl”  increasingly  less  palatable?    What  is  their  true  impact  on
economies taking part in the process and on the rest of the world?  There are different
ways in which we can shed some light on these questions.  There is, of course, the usual
“stumbling  vs.  building”  block  type  of  arguments  seeking  to  assess  the  impact  on  the
parallel process of multilateral liberalization as well as on multilateralism as an institution
(embodied in the form of WTO).
18 Cf. Richard Baldwin, 2006.52
Although this issue has been heavily researched and debated by many, the gap
between the proponents of either view is not any narrower today – 300 PTAs later – than it
was when the debate started.
19 Proponents of the “stumbling blocks” view still hold that
the proliferation of preferential trade, because of its discriminatory nature, weakens the
fundamentals of multilateralism and, indirectly, the case of free trade.  They also argue
that  spreading  “negotiating  (and  political)  capital”  across  multilateral  and  preferential
negotiations leaves developing countries in an inferior position compared to developed
countries, thus weakening the former group’s chances for modifying the global system
according to their developmental needs.
Advocates of the “building blocs” view, in contrast, put forward positive experiences
stemming from the process of PTA proliferation, such as:
(a) Gaining negotiation experience;
(b) Obtaining  deeper  openings  in  selected  sectors/markets,  and  facing  lesser
resistance to the opening of domestic markets;
(c) Allowing firms to learn how to export to friendlier markets;
(d) Removing divergences in harmonization or mutual recognition areas faster;
(e) Creating competitive liberalization and thus widening free(r) trade; and
(f) Providing the possibility of revenue compensation within the preferential bloc.
A relatively new contribution to the “building vs. stumbling blocks” literature (Limao,
2006, among others) indicates that the United States and European Union types of preferential
trade have had a negative impact on multilateral liberalization.  This impact should be
looked at from the perspective of the impact on the governance of global trade (functioning
of WTO), and the level of protectionism in global trade.  When focusing on the impact
made by PTAs in the Asia-Pacific region, it appears that so far they have hindered the
operation of WTO in terms of its “rule-making” capacity, even though they have not resulted
in any obvious direct trade-diverting costs (Pomfret, 2007).
However,  the  proliferation  of  RTAs  should  be  seen  as  a  threat  to  the  business
community as well as the global production system, as this regulatory complexity raises
the costs or production (for example, see Fung, 2005).  It can easily cause production to
move  from  being  comparative  advantage-based  to  competitive  liberalization-based
(cf. World Trade Organization, 2007).  This limits the potential of trade to serve as an
engine of growth and thus limits the choices of policymakers in the medium to long term.
WTO,  which  is  the  main  pillar  of  the  multilateral  trading  system,  responded  to
this RTA proliferation on two fronts.  Firstly, it continued to motivate all stakeholders to
increase efforts to conclude the DDA successfully (cf. Evenett, this publication).  The DDA
has  pro-development  potentials.    It  can  provide  market  access,  which  is  important  to
developing  country  producers.    It  allows  for  policy  space,  which  is  necessary  to  the
19 See  Bhagwati,  1992  for  early  discussions  and  Baldwin,  2006  for  a  summary  of  more  recent
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protection  of  development  interests,  and  not  just  the  narrow  interests  of  a  select  few.
Because it is global, there is scope for delivering trade concessions across more sectors
and disciplines than that permitted by many bilateral agreements.  Furthermore, it incorporates
the use of “Aid for Trade” as an instrument for delivering development through assistance
in achieving deeper and wider liberalization of trade, as it can soften trade adjustment
shocks.  It thus helps trade negotiations to maintain their role of “reform anchors”, as it
provides countries with external incentives to implement difficult and costly, yet desirable
policy changes that they would otherwise be unable to achieve politically.
Second, WTO members have made progress in their attempt to improve disciplines
related  to  RTAs.   A  draft  decision  on  a  Transparency  Mechanism  for  Regional  Trade
Agreements awaits conclusion of the DDA to become permanent discipline.  Preferential
and multilateral liberalization share the objective of liberalizing trade but differ significantly
in  the  approach;  RTAs  are  discriminatory  while  multilateral  liberalization  is  intended  to
be non-discriminatory (its principle of non-discrimination or MFN is weakened by various
exemptions and exceptions that members permit).  This tension between the approaches,
among other things, resulted in the move by the WTO members to improve disciplines in
the multilateral system on RTAs.
Research in area of trade and investment liberalization and its impact on development
need to focus on providing comparative analyses of impacts of alternative path to liberalization
from various perspectives (economic, social, developmental and institutional) with direct
bearing on policymaking in the region.  Objectives of so focused a research programme
would include, inter alia:
(a) The identification of institutional differences in trade policymaking, relevant to
engagement in regionalism, and assessment of how differences in the level
of “social inclusiveness” between countries influence the choice of liberalization
path;
(b) Estimating direct and indirect costs of engagement in the regionalism path;
(c) Analyzing  the  impacts  of  RTAs  in  the  region  and  outside  it,  in  terms  of
trade-creating and trade-diverting effects, and the effects on poverty.  It would
include various dimensions of impacts (gender, environment, labour standards,
democratization and security) in addition to standard economic dimensions of
welfare changes (cf. Oxfam, 2007);
(d) An assessment of how the new “transparency mechanism” adds to the WTO
disciplines on RTAs and whether it can improve the quality of RTAs negotiated
in the region;
(e) The identification of possible frameworks and paths for RTA consolidation
and the study of possibilities for multilateralization of regional preferences.
It is necessary to stress that both regional and multilateral paths to liberalization
will  continue  to  exercise  a  strong  impact  on  trade  and  trade  policy  in  the Asia-Pacific
region and the world.  Notwithstanding the fact that PTAs may be completely “appropriate54
solutions to national policy needs, they may confer credibility on policy regimes, [and] help
to  solve  political  problems  or  increase  competition”  (Schiff  and  Winters,  2003),  there
are  many  other  situations  where  PTAs  unnecessarily  increase  the  economic  price  for
non-economic  (and  uncertain)  gains  and/or  increase  cost  of  an  inappropriately  chosen
trade liberalization path.  It is true, therefore, that for many developing countries in the
region, the key to development lies in improving overall economic policies, including trade
policy.  Whether a country follows the regional or multilateral path, domestic economic
reform is imperative in order to maximize the gains from trade (and investment) liberalization.
Meantime, both policymakers and researchers have attempted to identify common
good policies and practices, and are packaging them in forms of “manuals” or “do/do not”
guides (cf. Goode, 2005).  Policymakers are advised to consult such manuals with the
caveat that good and evidence-based policymaking is definitely helped by tapping into the
experience of others while remembering that solid analytical assessment of policy alternatives
is required.  Furthermore, it is evident that “one size does NOT fit all” and that these
collections  of  good  practices  and  policies  can  serve  only  as  frameworks  for  assisting
policymakers to identify the appropriate approach for a case at hand.
E.  Conclusion
This chapter clarifies what types of preferential trade agreements are emerging in
Asia and the Pacific, and it establishes the fact that they vary widely in motivation, form,
coverage and content.  Bilateral agreements are much preferred to plurilateral or regional
ones, while “free” trade areas/agreements are the most frequent form.  However, in most
cases, they push achievement of “free” trade several years into the future.  Increasingly,
countries are opting for a partnership or framework agreement – in principle, to signal that
either they mean much more than trade integration or that they really do not mean serious
trade integration, but are using the format to put together a framework of cooperation in
several  (non-trade-related)  areas.    More  often,  the  latter  is  the  case.    This  probably
explains to some degree why a number of countries sign multiple agreements with the
same partners.
Analysis has also discovered a reluctance to commit to full and quick liberalization
in merchandise trade and to expose “other than goods” trade areas (including WTO-plus)
to preferential liberalization.  In summary, regionalism in Asia and the Pacific has not, so
far, resulted in significant trade-diverting effects for the rest of the world.  This also means
that it has not succeeded in increasing intraregional trading linkages in terms of enhancing
south-south cooperation or region-wide trade.  Thus, as one possible approach, the creation
of a large trading bloc(s) through policy-led consolidation of binding rules for series of
PTAs (currently with heterogeneous rules), without trade-diverting effects for those economies
left outside, could be considered.
A necessary next step in research is to establish conceptual frameworks for the
consolidation of multiple PTAs, and to determine empirically if and by how much such
consolidation of existing preferential deals will improve welfare and reduce poverty compared
with the current situation.55
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By Myrna S. Austria
The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and bilateral trade agreements
is the most significant trend in international trade policy since the 1990s.  Most members
of WTO are party to at least one RTA.  This is happening even while the world is becoming
increasingly integrated because of the intensive trade liberalization around the globe.  By
its nature, such arrangements discriminate against non-members.  Parties to the agreements
grant each other preferential treatment on a reciprocal basis.  Likewise, as one country
can be a member of more than one RTA, the overlapping RTAs can increase the risk of
inconsistencies in trading rules among RTAs, which in turn can lead to implementation
problems.  Such inconsistencies can cause systemic risks on the functioning of WTO by
rendering  future  efforts  to  develop  multilateral  rules  difficult,  if  not  impossible  (Austria,
2003).  All these factors have raised concerns over their effects on the trade environment
as well as the trading system.  Yet, the trend is expected to continue.
A.  Forces driving bilateralism and regionalism
Several factors have been seen as contributing to this continuing phenomenon.
First, there is now less incentive for countries to engage in WTO, given the extensive tariff
liberalization over the past decades.  WTO continues to focus on tariffs in manufacturing
and less on agricultural products, which is of interest to developing member countries.
Second, tariffs are no longer seen as the most important obstacle to international
trade.  Non-tariff and non-border issues are increasingly becoming more important in the
improvement of international exchange, including trade and investment facilitation, competition
policy, government procurement, and intellectual property rights.  However, these issues
are difficult for WTO to handle because of political sensitivity, since they affect national
sovereignty.  Nonetheless, many consider these issues easier to negotiate bilaterally or by
like-minded countries compared to the diverse WTO membership.
Third, the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis during 1997–1998 has demonstrated
the need for cooperation in managing the existing integration.  The crisis spread quickly
around the region, with little regard to differences in the fundamentals of the economies
(Tay, 2001).  The kind of integration that already existed in the region was of no help to the
economies in doing anything to prevent the contagion (Austria, 2003).  This realization
increased the awareness of the affected economies that they should do something by
themselves as a region.
Fourth,  APEC  lost  its  momentum  for  trade  liberalization  as  manifested  by  the
failure of the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL).  The disappointing outcome of
EVSL  shows  that  moving  beyond  the  voluntary  approach  for  liberalization  to  binding60
commitments may not be relied upon as an instrument for regional liberalization in APEC.
The experience also showed that not all members of APEC, particularly Japan and the
United States (the two leading economic powers in the world and in Asia and the Pacific),
are willing to take active participation in APEC’s concerted unilateral approach to liberalization.
They are, in fact, more likely to deliver their APEC commitments through the negotiated
process of WTO (Scollay and Gilbert, 2001).  Hence, formation of sub-RTAs within APEC
could  be  regarded  as  an  instrument  for  expediting  liberalization  among  “like-minded”
economies in the region that are willing to proceed with liberalization ahead of the others.
Finally, in the case of the ASEAN, there is the increasing pressure to stay competitive,
including the rapid emergence of China as an economic power and the growing attraction
of India among foreign investors.  The high level of economic growth of China is disruptive
to some sectors in ASEAN, especially in labour-intensive industries.  Rising wages and
costs in ASEAN are reducing its comparative advantage under the current industrial structure
and shifting the balance to China and India (Austria, 2003 and 2005).  The presence of
global  production  networks  (GPNs)  among  multinational  companies  (MNCs)  in ASEAN
creates an incentive for it to reduce transaction costs through the progressive elimination
of  rules  of  origin  requirements,  reduced  trade  barriers,  and  greater  capital  and  labour
mobility.  Otherwise, an increase in production and administrative costs of these MNCs will
force them to move out of the ASEAN region.
However, such an environment for GPNs requires an economic integration that is
far  deeper  and  more  comprehensive  than  that  currently  aimed  at  by  the ASEAN  Free
Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and the ASEAN
Investment Area  (AIA).    Thus,  given  the  current  resistance  to  further  economic  policy
reforms in the region, especially from those still recovering from the Asian financial crisis,
ASEAN’s extraregional linkages provide an opportunity to push the needed reforms that
otherwise would have been more difficult, if not impossible, without triggering national and
regional sensitivities (Austria, 2006).  Most of these reforms are in the areas of deregulation
and structural reforms to further promote economic growth (Urata, 2004).
Furthermore, the proliferation of bilateral agreements and RTAs in North America
and Europe, and recently in East Asia, has created many new competitors for ASEAN, for
both export markets and sources of foreign direct investment (FDI).  ASEAN members
know that they face discriminatory deals from arrangements in which they are not members.
This is particularly relevant to ASEAN-5 who are hosts to a critical mass of global electronics
players from the United States, Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province
of China (Austria, 2005).  Since RTAs/FTAs are characterized by lower barriers to trade
and investment, reduced transaction costs, harmonized standards and legal norms, GPNs
would prefer to locate their subsidiaries or outsource their production to economies with
which their own economies are linked through FTAs (Stein and Daude, 2001).
In addition, the rules of origin in FTAs and RTAs encourage MNCs to locate in
economies that belong to the same RTA/FTA as their source economies in order to overcome
such rules of origin.  In short, RTAs/FTAs in which an economy is not a member may
displace that economy’s exports.  Thus, ASEAN’s extraregional linkages provide a way out61
from the differential treatment and trade diversion.  Effectively, the ASEAN economies are
now competing as hosts to GPN-related foreign investment with other developing economies
that belong to the same RTAs/FTAs as the economies of the United States, Japan and
Europe (Austria, 2005).
Still related to the issue of the proliferation of FTAs/RTAs, ASEAN’s extraregional
linkages increase its leverage in trade negotiations and discussions, particularly in WTO
(Munakata, 2002), and amplifies its voice in regional issues given its increased stakes in
regional developments (Soesastro, 2003).
B.  Making regionalism work
The proliferation of RTAs has raised concern over the effects on the trade environment
as well as on the trading system.  The usual question of whether RTAs are building blocks
or stumbling blocks for the rules-based multilateral trading system under WTO has been
greatly debated in the literature.  Whether an RTA brings about a gain in welfare or not
depends  on  the  balance  between  trade  diversion  and  trade  creation.    Trade  diversion
occurs when an inefficient company inside an RTA is able to gain market access, because
of the preferential agreement, at the expense of an efficient firm in a non-member of that
RTA.  On the other hand, trade is created when efficient firms within an RTA are able to
expand  their  market  shares  at  the  expense  of  inefficient  firms  in  non-members.    The
overall impact depends on the net effect of trade creation and trade diversion.
Since regionalism is expected to continue, making it work in favour of global free
trade has become a challenge to policymakers, the academia and international development
agencies.  Possible areas in which this could be attained are:
(a) Strict enforcement by WTO of Article XXIV of GATT, which allows the formation
of RTAs.  Article XXIV has not been binding.  Thus, all RTAs and bilateral
agreements should be subject to (i) a WTO-consistency test, such as the
adoption of liberal rules of origin, (ii) ensuring broad product coverage, including
sensitive sectors and minimizing exclusions, and (iii) the provision of clear
phase-outs of exclusions;
(b) A frank assessment of RTAs, taking into account their stated motivations and
whether those stated motivations are best met by using RTAs; and
(c) A successful conclusion of the Doha Round, which is still the best solution to
possible adverse effects arising from the proliferation of RTAs.
C.  Possible areas of research
1.  Investment issues as they relate to RTAs/FTAs
Much of the discussion and research concerning the effects of RTAs has been
focused more on trade and less on investment.  The implications of RTAs with regard to62
possible  investment  diversion  should  be  examined  and  measured,  and  particularly  the
effects on technology transfers and increased productivity and efficiency of domestic firms.
2.  Reforms at WTO
The  Doha  Round  should  review  the  relevance  and  applicability  of Article  XXIV,
given the proliferation of RTAs.  WTO should formulate a framework for regionalism to
make it work in favour of global trade.
3.  Common framework for bilateralism/regionalism in ASEAN
ASEAN is proceeding with an ad hoc approach in dealing with its extraregional
linkages, without the guidance of a single common framework.  This is also true even
among the individual members who are pursuing bilateral trade agreements.  The absence
of a single common framework makes the building block process more complicated than it
appears, if not impossible (Austria, 2006).  In fact, it endangers the whole building block
process as it could lead to a series of agreements that differ greatly from each other.  This
could give rise to the “spaghetti bowl” effects, where each agreement will have different
scope and tariff reduction schedules, different rules of origin etc.  Thus, instead of becoming
building blocks, the bilateral initiatives become stumbling blocks.
4.  Ex-post empirical work on the impact of trade liberalization
Much  of  the  empirical  work  on  trade  liberalization  has  been  ex  ante.    Usually,
computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  analyses  show  the  positive  benefits  of  trade
liberalization.  However, some developing countries that have opened up their economies
have  not  experienced  the  promised  benefits  of  trade  liberalization.    This  has  become
a  question  and  a  puzzle  to  many.    On  the  other  hand,  the  dynamic  effects  of  trade
liberalization  on  the  economy  (such  as  increased  productivity,  technology  transfer,
macroeconomic  stability  etc.)  are  not  captured  by  standard  CGE  models.    Thus,  the
effects of trade liberalization could have been understated.
The above issues call for an ex-post evaluation of the impact of trade liberalization.
The ex-post evaluation could be a combination of a general equilibrium analysis as well as
industrial or sectoral studies.  However, the latter has been less studied.
5.  Impact of non-tariff and non-border issues on growth
The impact of trade and investment facilitation, competition policy, intellectual property
rights,  government  procurement  and  other  non-border  issues  on  economic  growth  has
received less attention in empirical work.  However, since these issues are increasingly
becoming  the  primary  factors  affecting  international  exchanges  of  goods  and  services,
research activities should focus on them.63
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